Is there a ‘culture of corruption’ in politics and business?

James Matthews

The context to our discussion was the current public focus on scandals and corruption. In business, we see the Enron trial, criticisms of excessive executive pay and oil executives blamed for extortionate gas prices. In politics, there are the Abramoff and DeLay cases, as well as charges of cronyism (eg, the appointment of Michael Brown at FEMA) and other scandals (eg, the Valerie Plame case). In both the business and political spheres, critics refer to corruption as being “endemic”, “systemic” and “unprecedented”.

There is also a broadening of the discussion. The Democrats, in fact, have popularized the phrase “culture of corruption”, hoping to link both the recent Bush scandals with a wider sense that business-political ties have grown too incestuous under the current administration. There are also those who say that the problem is society-wide: for example, David Callahan’s book, The Cheating Culture, claims that the problems in business and politics are part of a wider problem of cheating in all areas of social life, including students cheating on SATs and baseball players using steroids. The discussion has moved beyond questions of institutional arrangements to challenge the integrity of the participants in the process. So, instead of traditional arguments that business is pursuing the narrow pursuit of profit, or politicians are engaging in partisan politics (or representing business at the expense of the electorate), there is a debate about the moral character of the people involved.

Most believe corruption is a serious and widespread problem, and there isn’t a simple left/right divide on the issue. In fact, if you ask someone “is there a culture of corruption?”, they are most likely to say “yes, next question.” As mentioned, Democrats are hoping to seize on this opportunistically, with the aim of bringing the Bush administration down (some even talk of bringing impeachment charges if the Democrats do well in the November congressional elections). But Republicans are worried about this too – witness Matthew Continetti’s book just published, The K Street Gang. There is a consensus that much needs to change – from legislation to ethical training.

The group discussed the issue, seeking to examine some of the unstated assumptions behind the way the topic is normally raised. Questions included:

• Is the extent of corruption exaggerated? How does it compare with earlier periods? Are the Bush administration’s ties with business and money exceptional? Are there more careerist, unprincipled politicians today?
• Does the Bush administration have an ideological vision? And/or a narrow, self-serving agenda? If the Republicans are in bed with the lobbyists, what results do they have to show for it?
• If there has been an over-reaction to corruption cases, why? Is it simply because certain proponents of the idea of a “culture of corruption”, such as the Democrats, are pushing the idea in the hope of benefiting electorally? Or is there a broader climate of suspicion of individual motives that leads to the notion resonating among the public?
• Will the anti-corruption sentiment benefit the Democrats, or will both parties be blamed?
• Will the proposed reforms bring greater or less democracy? Is the public passive stand-bys when governments are overthrown by impeachment, courts of law, or other forms of “crown intrigue”?
• Even if corruption is not as bad as in the past, if the current level is seen as intolerable, many believe something should be done. If so, what can be done?

After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order (European Perspectives: A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism), Emmanuel Todd

George Blecher

We tried to deal with this diffuse but provocative book by breaking the discussion down into three general areas: Todd’s thesis that American democracy has evolved toward oligarchy, and is no longer held up as a general standard by the rest of the world; the thesis put forth by Todd (and Francis Fukuyama) that modernity brings stability, and that the conflicts in transitional societies like the Middle East are actually short-term reactions to a more general movement toward democratization;
and an examination of the US as a reluctant empire, and specifically in what sense it is or isn’t “universalist.”

Regarding the first point, the general sense of the participants was that perhaps US democracy had moved somewhat toward oligarchy, but this was also true of other democracies, and that within the “ruling” class there was little organization or even communication, and there was also a good deal of elasticity, as evidenced by the warring factions in the Republican party. The group seemed to think that Todd and Fukuyama were onto something in their view of the stability that modernism brings, and that beneath the sensationalistic headlines and Huntington Manicheanism there were indications of a general movement toward democracy even in the Middle East.

The point about universalism produced a number of interesting responses. One of the participants suggested that French universalism was only skin-deep, and that in terms of a “successful” empire, the British with their policy of indirect rule were more effective than the French and Russians. Also, one could make a case that multiculturalism was just as “universalist” as inclusiveness, and that the real problem with American hegemony was that it offered hollow slogans instead of the procedural apparatus for real change.

Alan Miller

I am not as convinced that Todd’s analysis was very useful. It seemed severely lacking any methodological structure and rigour and seemed to cavalierly make statements that could not be corroborated. Unfortunately, it has become quite acceptable to make impressionistic declarations today – and often be trumpeted as ‘insightful’ or ‘thought provoking.’ While some of his empirical research on birth rates was interesting (and numerous people commented on his diagrams) the leaps he made to generalisations often fell short of explaining and understanding phenomena.

With regard to the first point, it seems that the elite of the western world and most certainly within the United States, has lost faith in what their own project is. Rather than the rest of the world losing faith necessarily in the standard of a ‘universal’ or exceptional ‘Americanism’, perhaps it is the leaders of America that are suffering from an existential crisis. No longer able to motivate the American project in terms of opposition to some Soviet threat, with the contesting ideas of Left and Right departed the political stage, what is left is TINA (There Is No Alternative) to the market, with very little inspiration. Worse, perhaps, a sense of anxiety and fear pervades the very culture in which we operate that presents the human project as almost pathological: humans are ‘mad, bad and dangerous’ and somewhat out of control.

The ‘culture wars’ in the US saw a protracted debate around the themes of western identity and the legacy of the enlightenment, with ‘Dead White Males’ being presented as responsible for much of the unsavoury activities of the colonial and imperial periods. However, alongside this, the ascendancy of post modernism and a broader unease with reason meant that many of the certainties that previous rulers could count on have disappeared. This has had significant ramifications for the ability to motivate the idea of ‘America’ both domestically and internationally.

While some agreed with the points Todd made with regard to the Middle East and emerging stability – contrary to populist presentations of an out of control central Asian region – the very nature of western disorientation often seems to lead to more problems than it solves. The ‘empty proceduralism’ which policy devoid of political intent, just managerial pragmatism can often be just as destructive (or perhaps, at times, more so) than a specific campaign of militarism with objectives and vision.

In paraphrasing Nietzsche towards the end of the book on (p.197) Todd suggests that we can ‘wrest ourselves from the hold of ideology, the illusion of the moment, and the media’s permanent false alarm.’ However, while Todd has attempted to dissect the anti American sentiments prevalent within the anti globalisation ‘discourse,’ he has missed the central point that the problem seems not so much to be needing to renounce old ideologies, but the fact that people generally have given up on the idea that politics can be a solution to the problems of the people. As one Salon member noted, the exiting of the people from the political stage has made it largely irrelevant. In effect that means suspending history, until we have decided that we can make it again.

From the Profane to the Sacred: The Rise of Reverence in Secular Institutions - Introduced by Tiffany Jenkins, Director of the Arts and Society Programme, Institute of Ideas, London.

A new phenomenon has infiltrated the museum world: rather than the meaning of an object being presented to a broad public, museums are endorsing a ritualistic role for objects, even when this means closing down access to viewers who are not "ritualistic users." The National Museum of the American Indian in Washington is an example. The NMAI is at the forefront of institutions that are elevating the sacred and religious significance of material in the collection over the secular approach of studying the objects. Many objects are hidden from public access, or access is by designated gender or tribal affiliation, and rituals take place behind closed doors. Certain categories of objects are not conserved for longevity, but left to deteriorate as this is considered to be the "natural life of the object."

It is important to place this developing practice in a wider literature of museums and their authority.

Questions raised included:

• Should archives in art stores be a source of research only or be made available to the public?

• Do we understand artifacts based on origin or in the context of the museum, albeit in a different country?